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ABSTRACT 
Understanding what conditions must be satisfied for a health inequality to be a health 
inequity (disparity) is crucial for health policy makers. The failure to understand what 
constitutes a health inequity, and confusing health inequalities with health inequities 
threatens the successful creation of health policies by diverting needed attention and 
resources away from addressing health inequalities that are health inequities. More generally, 
the failure threatens to undercut our ability to tell what research is relevant to the creation of 
health policies that aim to mitigate or eliminate health inequities. With this in mind, the 
principal aim of the present paper is to provide a framework within which to understand the 
relationships of concepts such as health difference, health inequality and health inequity to 
one another. Under the umbrella heading of “health disparities”, which is often used as a 
catch-all expression to refer to various, sometimes very different concepts of health, health 
outcomes and health determinants, the paper draws attention to two important axes in this 
framework; the axis of health inequalities (the empirical dimensions) and the axis of health 
inequities (the normative dimensions). Using the writings of John Dewey on valuation and 
value judgments, the paper explores how it is possible for a claim about the existence, 
prevalence or scope of health disparities to have both an empirical dimension and a 
normative dimension. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The 2003 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, The Future of the Public’s Health in the 
21
st
 Century, concludes that compared with U.S. residents living in 1900, those in 2003 “are 
healthier, live longer, and enjoy lives that are less likely to be marked by injuries, ill health, or 
premature death.” (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 
21st Century, Board on Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, 2003)  Unfortunately, even 
with these improvements and benefits, health inequalities between subpopulations continue to 
exist.  Moreover, there are statistically significant differences amongst subpopulations in the U.S. 
relative to how close they come to achieving health targets such as those established by Healthy 
People 2020.  The presence of these health inequalities means that it is likely that there are 
differences amongst the subpopulations in health outcomes (e.g., infant mortality), and in having 
opportunities to attain or maintain opportunities for good health. If the differences are unfair or 
unjust, they constitute health inequities (often referred to, especially in the U.S., as health 
disparities).   
A principal goal of health policies is to either maintain a fair and just distribution of 
health resources, or change the distribution of health resources to bring about fair and just 
distributions of health opportunities and outcomes.  Thus, understanding what conditions must be 
satisfied for a health inequality to be a health inequity (disparity) is crucial for health policy 
makers. In this connection, Paula Braveman writes that “How one defines ‘health disparities’ or 
‘health inequity’ can determine not only which measurements are monitored by national, 
state/provincial, and local governments and international agencies, but also which activities will 
receive support from resources allocated to address health disparities/inequalities and health 
equity.” (Paula Braveman, 2006)  The failure to understand what constitutes a health inequity 
(disparity), and confusing health inequalities with health inequities threatens the successful 
creation of health policies by diverting needed attention and resources away from addressing 
health inequalities that are, in fact, health inequities. More generally, the failure threatens to 
undercut our ability to tell what research is relevant to the creation of health policies that aim to 
mitigate or eliminate health inequities.  
With this in mind, the principal aim of the present paper is to provide a framework 
(Taylor, 2001) within which to understand the relationships of concepts such as health 
difference, health inequality and health inequity to one another. Under the umbrella heading of 
“health disparities”, which is often used as a catch-all expression to refer to various, sometimes 
very different concepts of health, health outcomes and health determinants, the paper draws 
attention to two important axes in this framework; the axis of health inequalities (the empirical 
dimensions) and the axis of health inequities (the normative dimensions).  Using the writings of 
John Dewey on valuation and value judgments, the paper explores how it is possible for a claim 
about the existence, prevalence or scope of health disparities to have both an empirical 
dimension and a normative dimension. Thus, the present paper is not an empirical investigation 
of how one or more populations differ relative to some well-defined quantitative health related 
metric. Instead, in what follows we seek to provide a “conceptual space” (framework) within 
which it is possible to understand the relationships of empirical investigations and policy 
deliberations regarding health disparities to one another, and how they can, and do, and should 
inform one another. 
 
 
48 The Normative Dimensions of Health Disparities – Andrew Ward et al. 
 
Journal of Health Disparities Research and Practice, Volume 6, Issue 1, Spring 2013 
Health Differences and Health Inequalities 
 In the literature on health disparities, the expressions ‘health disparities’, ‘health 
differences’, ‘health inequities’, and ‘health inequalities’ are sometimes used interchangeably. 
(Kindig, 2007; Krieger, 2005)  This unfortunate conflation often creates confusion about the 
character of health measures and their monitoring undertaken by health services research as well 
as by governments and agencies. (Paula Braveman, 2006; Carter-Pokras & Baquet, 2002; 
Murray, Gakidou, & Frenk, 1999)  Equally important, the conflation obfuscates what conditions 
warrant judgments that empirical variations in distributions of health outcomes or opportunities 
to attain or maintain good health are ethically unacceptable.  To that end, we begin with the 
expression about which there is general agreement that its content is principally empirical – viz., 
‘health difference’. (Paula Braveman & Gruskin, 2003; Gakidou, Murray, & Frenk, 2000; 
Gwatkin, 2000; Kawachi, Subramanian, & Almeida-Filho, 2002; Krieger, 2005; Norheim & 
Asada, 2009; Raphael, 2000)  A health difference is an empirically measurable variation in the 
health characteristics or determinants of health characteristics in one or more populations relative 
to some reference measure.   
Because of the multiple dimensions of the concept of inequality (and equality) (Gakidou 
et al., 2000; Gwatkin, 2000; Sen, 2002), there are various ways to characterize health 
inequalities.  Nevertheless, we can say generally that a health inequality is a summary measure 
that captures one or more specific differences in the overall distribution of a chosen health metric 
among populations or between one or more populations and some reference measure. (Carter-
Pokras & Baquet, 2002; Kawachi et al., 2002; Norheim & Asada, 2009; Truman et al., 2011)  
Characterized in this way, it follows that all health differences entail the existence of a health 
inequality.  For example, the mortality rate in the U.S. Non-Hispanic White subpopulation is 
different from the mortality rates in the U.S. Hispanic subpopulation and the U.S. Non-Hispanic 
Black subpopulation. Thus, as a function of the mortality rate, the health of the U.S. Hispanic 
and Non-Hispanic Black subpopulations is not equal to the health of the U.S. Non-Hispanic 
White subpopulation.  Significantly, not only is the mortality rate in the U.S. Hispanic 
subpopulation not the same as the U.S. Non-Hispanic White subpopulation, it is also not the 
same as the mortality rate in the U.S. Black subpopulation. This difference in the mortality rates 
between the U.S. Hispanic subpopulation and the U.S. Non-Hispanic Black subpopulation is also 
a health inequality.  
While the mortality rate in the U.S. Hispanic subpopulation is not the same as the 
mortality rate in the U.S. Non-Hispanic Black subpopulation, disparities researchers typically 
compare both the U.S. Hispanic and the Non-Hispanic Black subpopulations to the U.S. Non-
Hispanic White subpopulation.  One reason for comparing the U.S. Black and Hispanic 
subpopulations to the U.S. Non-Hispanic White subpopulation is that the Non-Hispanic White 
subpopulation has been the majority (numerically) population while the Non-Hispanic Black and 
Hispanic subpopulations have been the minority (numerically) populations.  A second reason is 
that, historically, the U.S. Non-Hispanic White subpopulation has had better health outcomes, 
better health access and better access to needed health care than most other U.S. subpopulations. 
A third reason underlying the comparison is the widely held claim that the U.S. Non-Hispanic 
White subpopulation has treated the U.S. Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic populations unjustly 
or unfairly, resulting in institutionally embedded social disadvantages and injustices for these 
two U.S. subpopulations. (Jones, 2010; Paula Braveman, 2006)   
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By themselves, claims about the presence of health inequalities do not have any 
normative content. (Krieger, 2005)  As Iris Young writes, claims regarding equality or inequality 
are, in themselves, “simply factual comparisons of amounts or degrees of some variables 
between or among entities.” (Young, 2001)  For example, surveys such as the American 
Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) reveal that the percentage 
of the U.S. Non-Hispanic Black subpopulation with health insurance is less than 100 percent. 
Similarly, the percentage of the U.S. Hispanic subpopulation with health insurance is less than 
100 percent.  Based on these surveys, we may claim that the percentages for both subpopulations 
are less than the stipulated objective/target of 100 percent set by Healthy People 2020.  This is a 
claim (statement of fact) about how the percentages of people with health insurance in two U.S. 
subpopulations are not equal to the stipulated target in Healthy People 2020.  What is important, 
though, is that it does not immediately follow from this claim (even assuming that it is true) that 
there is anything ethically objectionable in the two subpopulations falling short of the Healthy 
People 2020 target.  There is something more needed to justify the inference from the factual, 
descriptive claim about health insurance coverage to the normative judgment that it is ethically 
objectionable that the percentages of people with health insurance in two U.S. subpopulations are 
not equal to the Healthy People 2020 target. 
To say that claims about health equalities and inequalities do not have any normative 
content is different from saying that no value judgments underlie the identification and 
measurement of the inequalities.  Everything that we measure is interpreted – the experiential 
data about which measurements are made “are not raw experiences but rather beliefs about what 
we experienced.” (Misak, 2008a)  In this connection, Julian Le Grand writes that since 
“Atkinson’s path-breaking article on [economic] inequality measurement (1970) it has been 
generally accepted that the use of statistical measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient 
or the coefficient of variation, implies the acceptance of certain values.” (Le Grand, 1991)  
Nevertheless, Le Grand continues, the inference from the fact that the use of statistical measures 
of inequality implies the acceptance of certain values to the claim that “inequality (and therefore 
equality) is itself normative” (Le Grand, 1991) is not a legitimate inference.  The fact “that the 
choice of summary measures of inequality involves value-judgments”, writes Le Grand, “does 
not imply that the concept itself is normative.” (Le Grand, 1991)   
Although Le Grand’s remarks refer to methods for measuring economic inequality, an inequality 
that is often a social determinant of health (Raphael, 2000), the same point applies to measures 
used in determinations of purported health inequalities (e.g., population attributable risk, the 
concentration curve and index). (Paula Braveman, 2006; Wagstaff, Paci, & Doorslaer, 1991)  
Moreover, that we should be interested in race, ethnicity or functional status and not eye color or 
hair length reflects value judgments (sometimes explicit but more often implicit) about which 
inequalities are important when studying health inequalities or creating health policies. In the 
U.S., for instance, a principal focus has been on racial and ethnic inequalities, while 
internationally, inequalities due to differences in socioeconomic status (SES) have been a 
principal focus. (P. A. Braveman et al., 2011; Dehlendorf, Bryant, Huddleston, Jacoby, & 
Fujimoto, 2010; Dehlendorf et al., 2010; Krieger, 2005) Thus, while claims about health 
equalities and inequalities lack normative content, it is nonetheless true that to arrive at a notion 
of health inequality we must already have made value judgments “about what kinds of 
considerations ought to count when judging when health is (un)equal.” (Harper et al., 2010)   
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Health Inequalities and Health Inequities 
 Yukiko Asada writes that while health science researchers “have increasingly 
distinguished health inequity from health inequality … confusion over the terminology still 
persists”. (Asada, 2005)  The principal distinction is that unlike the concepts of equality and 
inequality, the concepts of equity and inequity are explicitly normative. (Chang, 2002; P. 
Braveman & Gruskin, 2003; Williams, 2005; Le Grand, 1991)  As Margaret Whitehead writes, 
“The term inequity has a moral and ethical dimension.” (Whitehead, 1991; Also, see Carter-
Pokras & Baquet, 2002)  To claim that a health inequality is also a health inequity is to claim that 
the inequality is, in some important sense, ethically unfair or unjust. (Murray et al., 1999; P. A. 
Braveman, 2003; Marchand, Wikler, & Landesman, 1998)  The qualification of ‘ethically’ to the 
concepts of unfairness and injustice is crucial.  For instance, Williams and Cookson write that in 
“economics the term ‘equity’ is usually taken to refer to fairness in the distribution of a good … 
and ‘fairness’ is taken almost unthinkingly to mean reducing inequalities.” (Williams & 
Cookson, 2000)  When applied to health inequalities, this unqualified, economic account of 
equity assumes that all health inequalities are ethically unfair and, as a result, are health 
inequities.  This assumption, which is tantamount to making equity claims independent of ethical 
judgments (Goddard & Smith, 2001), is not correct.   
To understand why not, suppose that a portion of a given population deliberately under-
utilizes, relative to the rest of the population, “some or all traditional (mainstream) health care 
services” because of informed, freely made “religious, esthetic, or cultural reasons”. (Daniels, 
1982)  In such a case, there is a health inequality between the subpopulation and the rest of the 
population in terms of access (although, perhaps not in terms of availability) to some or all 
mainstream health care. However, insofar as the inequality in utilization rates is not due to some 
exogenous factor (e.g., the unwillingness of physicians to provide medical treatment to people 
having the religious, esthetic or cultural characteristics in question) but is, instead, the result of 
informed, freely made choices by a portion of the population, the inequality is not a health 
inequity. (Daniels, 1988)  The general point is that because not all health inequalities are 
ethically unfair (P. Braveman & S. Gruskin 2003; S. Anand 2002; Oliver et al. 2002), the 
existence of a health inequality is not a sufficient condition for the existence for a health 
inequity. (Williams, 2005)  Therefore, following Fabienne Peter, the problem a theory of health 
equity faces is how to go from empirical identifications of health inequalities, such as 
inequalities in mortality or access to care, to the normative judgment that those inequalities are 
also health inequities. (Peter, 2011)   
The beginning of an answer is, in a broadly Deweyan sense, that a health inequality 
becomes a health inequity when, because of some problem or conflict in thinking otherwise 
(Dewey, 2008a), people come to “perceive and interpret” the inequality as a problem of 
unfairness or injustice and “come to some shared understanding that they want to change the 
situation.” (Stone, 2006)  When this happens, the inequality is attributed a normative value 
relevant for health policy choices (P. A. Braveman et al., 2011; Aday, Andersen, & Fleming, 
1980), where the connotation of ‘policy’ includes the creation of laws, regulations, and rules 
whose purpose is to exercise some degree of social control. Because the transformation of an 
inequality into an inequity is a function of the values held by specific communities at particular 
times, it follows that there is no single, universally applicable answer to the question of what 
inequalities are attributed a normative value relevant for policy choices.  In this respect, the 
transformation runs counter to what Arthur Caplan calls “the engineering model of applied 
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ethics”. (Caplan, 1983)  According to that top-down model, “there is a body of knowledge 
concerning ethics that persons can be more or less knowledgeable about”, and that knowledge 
becomes applied, transforming inequalities into inequities, by deducing conclusions for the 
appropriate ethical theories “in light of relevant empirical facts and descriptions of 
circumstances.” (Caplan, 1983)  This, though, is precisely what Dewey denies; for Dewey, each 
moral situation is unique, and rather than the present being subservient “to a rigid yet abstract 
future” (Dewey, 1988) outlined by the “true” or “correct” ethical theory and the principles that 
constitute that theory, each “moral situation is unique”, created by people attempting to interpret 
and address situations of conflict. (Dewey, 1988)  Ethical theories, principles and public policies 
are instruments of action whose purpose “is to converge all the instrumentalities of the social 
arts, of law, education, economics, and political science upon the construction of intelligent 
methods of improving the common lot.” (Dewey, 1997)  
Nevertheless, while the details may vary from community to community, it is possible to 
identify three general types of equality common to health policy discussions. In addition, since 
inequity is derivative of inequality (all instances of inequity are instances of inequality), it 
follows that there are three types of inequity. The first type of equality, equality of opportunity, 
requires that positions and possessions of goods (including welfare and well-being) are open to 
all people, and that when members of two or more populations have the same native talents and 
the same aspirations, they have the same realistic prospects for success in acquiring some 
objective. (Roemer, 2003)  To the degree that the prospects of members of two or more 
populations to acquire some objective vary only by the “foreseeable, avoidable” results of the 
members’ “own responsible choices” (Elford, 2012), any differences in the prospects for 
acquiring some objective are fair and just.  In contrast, when the variance in prospects is a 
function of native talents or circumstances into which the members are born, when the prospects 
vary by “brute luck” (Dworkin, 1981, 2001), then any differences in the prospects for acquiring 
some objective are unfair or unjust.  Thus, building on a remark by Braveman et al., (P. A. 
Braveman, Egerter, Cubbin, & Marchi, 2004) every person should have the same realistic 
prospect of achieving his or her “optimal health status” without distinction based on 
characteristics such as race or ethnic group, nationality, skin color, age, or disability status.   
For example, suppose that the objective in question is possession of health insurance. In 
the United States, there are subpopulations such as males, ages 30 to 35 having incomes that fall 
below the federal poverty limit, whose members typically cannot afford to purchase health 
insurance.  Because of their socio-economic status, these people have no realistic opportunity to 
purchase health insurance.  Since few, if any government programs provide public health 
insurance for members of this population, the prospects of this subpopulation to acquire health 
insurance coverage is generally not equal to those other U.S. subpopulations whose members 
have the financial resources to purchase health insurance or whose members are covered by 
government programs (e.g., Medicaid).  Thus, it is not the case that everyone in the population 
who wants health insurance coverage has the realistic prospect of acquiring such coverage. On 
the assumption that the political and socio-economic conditions that prevent males ages 30-35 
from acquiring insurance are due to circumstances over which they have no direct control, then 
the inequality of opportunity is also an inequity of opportunity. 
The second type of equality, substantive equality, refers either to the equal occurrence of 
some good in two or more populations, or to the fact that the occurrence of some good in one or 
more populations is at least equal to some stipulated target/objective.  In the context of health 
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and health care, an example of substantive equality is the Healthy People 2020 target of no more 
than 160.6 cancer deaths per 100,000 people in the U.S.  When the population meets the target, 
then there is substantive equality in the population relative to cancer deaths. This category 
captures differences in health outcomes or health status, as well as differences in the quality of 
health and received health care. For example, following Healthy People 2020, suppose that we 
assume that for all U.S. racial subpopulations, the number of new cases of diabetes per 1,000 
population aged 18 to 84 years that occur within the a given calendar year should be equal to or 
less 7.2 cases. In this case, if the number of new cases of diabetes per 1,000 Non-Hispanic Black 
subpopulation aged 18 to 84 is greater than 7.2 cases, then the difference between the reality and 
the stipulated Healthy People 2020 target is both a substantive inequality and a substantive 
inequity. 
The third type of equality is related to what Alan Gewirth calls an equality of generic 
rights, viz., “equality between the agent and his recipients with regard to their severally having 
the necessary conditions of agency.” (Gewirth, 1978)  On the assumption that having access to 
needed health care is a necessary condition of agency, we can refer to this subset of Gewirth’s 
equality of generic rights as access equality.  Such equality requires either that two or more 
populations are equal in terms of their access to needed health care, or that the access one or 
more populations have to needed health care is equal to or greater than that specified by some 
stipulated objective. For example, suppose that we assume that all adults in the U.S. population 
ought to have access to needed health care.  As established by a variety of surveys, adults in the 
U.S. with restricted mobility capabilities (e.g., people who must use a wheelchair) do not always 
have access to needed care (even though the resources to provide the needed care may be 
available). The inability to access needed care may be due to social determinants such as 
obstacles of the built environment, or inadequate transportation, or to some other source over 
which people with restricted mobility capabilities have no direct control. If we assume that all 
adults in the U.S. population ought to have access to needed health care, it follows that the health 
care inequality of access to needed health care that exists between the mobility challenged 
portion of the adult U.S. population and the standard set by the assumption is an access inequity. 
Although the expression ‘health disparities’ is sometimes used to refer to only health 
inequalities, typically, and especially in the United States, it is used more specifically to refer to 
health inequities.  Two simple examples illustrate the use of health inequities in identifications of 
health disparities. The first example comes from comparing the population of people ages 80 and 
over with the population of people ages 18 to 65.  All other things being equal, the mortality rate 
for the first population is greater than the mortality rate for the second population.  Thus, there is 
a substantive inequality between the first population and the second population. However, 
insofar as the inequality is due to natural biological (dis-) functions associated with age and not 
to exogenous factors such as inferior healthcare for people ages 80 and over, the health 
inequality is not a health inequity (health disparity).  
The second example concerns Glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) deficiency, 
which is a “hereditary condition in which red blood cells break down when the body is exposed 
to certain drugs or the stress of infection.” (A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia, 2010)  At least in 
the United States, men are more likely to have a G-6-PD deficiency than women are, and Blacks 
are more likely to have the deficiency than Non-Hispanic Whites are.  Thus, relative to the U.S. 
population, there is a substantive inequality between the Black, male subpopulation in terms of 
the prevalence of G-6-PD deficiency and the Non-Hispanic White, female subpopulation. (Frank, 
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2005) Nevertheless, because the difference is due to inherited biological characteristics, the 
health inequality is not a health inequity (health disparity).  A health inequality between a 
reference population and two or more other populations, or between a specific characteristic of 
one or more populations and a stipulated target, is a health disparity only if the health inequality 
is a health inequity in one of the three senses identified above. 
Assessing the Normative Dimensions 
 Based on the remarks and arguments made in the previous section, there is a centrally 
important question for those interested in health inequities (disparities). “What warrant do we 
have for the judgment that a specific metric for one or more populations ought not be less than 
(or greater than, depending on the metric) the same metric for either the reference population or 
a stipulated health objective/target?” There are many ways one could answer this question. Some 
authors try to answer the question by referring to health inequalities caused by social status.  For 
example, Braveman et al. write that we “use the term “social disparities in health” broadly here 
to refer to differences in health – or likely determinants of health – that are systematically 
associated with different levels of underlying social advantage or position in a social hierarchy.” 
(P. A. Braveman, Egerter, Cubbin, & Marchi, 2004) Similarly, Kilbourne et al. define health 
disparities “as observed clinically and statistically significant differences in health outcomes or 
health care use between socially distinct vulnerable and less vulnerable populations that are not 
explained by the effects of selection bias.” (Kilbourne, Switzer, Hyman, Crowley-Matoka, & 
Fine, 2006)  In both cases, the idea is that any health inequality resulting from a difference in 
social status is a health inequality that results from unjust or unfair social institutions (and their 
effects on groups of people) and so a health inequity. (Daniels, Kennedy, & Kawachi, 1999) 
Apart from the difficulty in operationally defining “social status”, such characterizations 
have at least two problems. First, the claim that a health inequality is a health inequity depends 
on whether the inequality in social position is an ethically acceptable one.  If the inequality in 
social position is an ethically acceptable one, then, presumably, any attendant health inequalities 
are ethically acceptable.  It follows that this approach to identifying health inequities is 
dependent upon a full account of what inequalities in social position are ethically acceptable and 
what differences are not ethically acceptable. For example, suppose that one’s economic status is 
a (social) determinant in a population of having health insurance. Furthermore, suppose that the 
society is one in which differential levels of economic status (e.g., income) are an ethically 
acceptable determinant of social position. These suppositions lead to several alternatives.  On the 
one hand, it may be that the health inequality of having insurance is not a health inequity. On the 
other hand, it may be that there is some tacit belief that either social status based on economic 
status is not acceptable or the acceptability of differential social status based on economic status 
is not relevant to the ethical assessment of the health difference.  
The second problem is that the characterizations assume that all health inequalities 
resulting from differences in social status or position in a social hierarchy are instances of 
inequity. This seems to be too strong a claim.  Suppose that public health insurance offered to 
those whose incomes are sufficiently low (e.g., Medicaid in the United States) will not pay for 
cosmetic surgeries such as liposuction, whereas at least some private health insurance will pay 
for such procedures. On the assumption that these kinds of procedures are costly, it follows that 
people with low incomes whose only health insurance is public have fewer opportunities for 
cosmetic health procedures than do people whose private health insurance will pay for the 
procedures.  Presumably, this is a health inequality in terms of opportunities for health services 
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due to social status based on income. Thus, according to the definitions above, this is an example 
of a health inequity. This, though, seems to widen, unacceptably, the scope of what counts as a 
health inequity. A differential in opportunities for health services related to cosmetic health 
procedures does not seem to rise to the level needed to make the health difference a health 
inequity. 
Certainly, there are other ways to identify which health inequalities rise to the level of 
health inequities. Norman Daniels argues, using ideas drawn from the writings of John Rawls, 
that the “goal of public health and medicine is to keep people as close as possible to the ideal of 
normal functioning, under reasonable resource constraints.” (Daniels et al., 1999) When there are 
inequalities in attainment of the ideal of normal functioning under reasonable resource 
constraints, the inequality is also an inequity.  In a health needs approach, the distribution of 
health resources that results in the health inequality is one in which the health needs of one or 
more segments of the target population are not satisfied. A distribution of health resources in 
which the health inequality was absent is one in which more health needs of the target population 
are satisfied. Although there are complexities associated with who determines what constitutes a 
health need and whether the relevant needs should be delimited to “basic needs” (Ward & 
Johnson, 2011), the concept is relatively clear; equitable health care is health care provided 
because of the health needs of a person.  As Aday et al. write, “Equity is, in fact, said to exist 
when services are distributed on the basis of need rather than as a result of structural or 
individual factors such as a family’s income level, persons’ racial characteristics, or the 
distribution of physicians in an area.” (Aday, Andersen, & Fleming, 1980)  In a human rights 
approach,  the distribution of health resources that results in the health inequality is one in which 
there is a violation of one or more of the “human health rights” of people in a target population. 
A distribution of health resources in which the health inequality was absent is one in which fewer 
(or no) human health rights of people in the target population are violated.   Thus, relative to the 
population in which there are fewer (or no) violations of human rights, there are health 
inequalities. Moreover, since the rights have normative value as human rights, the health 
inequalities are also health inequities.  
This short list of approaches does not exhaust the possibilities of how to delineate health 
inequalities that rise to the level of health inequities from those that do not.  Methodologically 
though, what is common to all these approaches is that the challenge of identifying which health 
inequalities are health inequities is one that comes from the prior acceptance of a specific ethical 
theory and then working out the implications of that theory. This, then, poses a dilemma of sorts.  
On the one hand, we believe that it is, at best, an open (and contested) question of whether there 
is a single best or correct ethical theory within which to frame the difference between health 
inequalities and health inequities.  Indeed, some people would argue that there is something 
misguided in talking about an ethical “theory” at all. On the other hand, without some account of 
which health inequalities are health inequities, there is no principled way to create health policies 
to address health inequities (disparities), or to allocate limited resources to address such 
inequities, or to make decisions about whether proposed research is truly concerned with health 
and health care inequities (disparities).   
Rather than trying to grasp the dilemma by either of its horns, we believe that the 
writings of Dewey offer a way to slip between the horns. Recall the Deweyan point made earlier 
that a health inequality becomes a health inequity when, because of some problem or conflict in 
thinking otherwise (Dewey, 2008a), people come to “perceive and interpret” the inequality as a 
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problem of unfairness or injustice and “come to some shared understanding that they want to 
change the situation.” (Stone, 2006)  Although much of traditional, Western ethics starts with 
some theory in which there are clear definitions of the concepts of unfairness and injustice, and 
then attempts to justify normative claims based on those definitions, Dewey’s approach is 
different.  For Dewey, discovery and reflective inquiry are the critical elements, not justification 
(Caspary, 2000); the conflicting and confused characteristics of actual, particular social 
situations lead to hypothetical judgments that they are situations of unfairness or injustice. 
(Dewey, 1991)  In this respect, conflicting and confused situations exist before the 
problematization of situations that comes from the use of characterizations such as unfairness 
and injustice in value judgments about the situations. This is what Dewey means when he writes 
that, “The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to 
inquiry.” (Dewey, 1991)  Value judgments are hypotheses made in an effort to understand and 
eliminate the conflict and confusion; the values of justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness, 
are constructs (instruments, tools) to define and address conflicting and confused situations. 
(Festenstein, 1997)   
According to Dewey, “No existing situation can be modified without counteracting 
obstructive and deflecting forces that render a given situation confused and conflicting” (Dewey, 
1991), and a necessary condition for such counteracting is that the situation be conceptualized by 
judgments using value characterizations.  Dewey refers to these judgments as “valuations”. 
(Dewey, 1922)  To the extent that valuations using specific characterizations (the specifics of 
unfairness and injustice) provide a conceptual framework that is successful in mitigating, 
reducing or eliminating the conflict and confusion, the valuations have warranted assertability 
and are retained.  This is the “pragmatic”, experimental character of Dewey’s approach to ethics. 
However if the valuations using the characterizations are not successful in mitigating, reducing 
or eliminating the conflict and confusion, the valuations, and the characterizations they 
incorporate, are modified or eliminated.  Judgments that situations are unfair or unjust are, 
therefore, instruments applied to a conflicted and confused situation to problematize it and to 
offer a means of resolving the conflict and confusion. 
In Dewey’s view, problems (conceptualized confused and conflicted situations) which 
“induce inquiry grow out of the relations of fellow beings to one another … [and] the meanings 
which have developed in the course of living, together with all the ways of forming and 
transmitting culture with all its constituents of tools, arts, institutions, traditions, and customary 
beliefs.” (Dewey, 1991)  Moreover, as noted by William Caspary, Dewey acknowledges that 
“Not every individual or group in a community will understand a problematic situation in the 
same way or bring the same purposes and values to it.” (Caspary, 2000)  As a result, there will 
likely be different conceptions of justice and fairness used to problematize any conflicted and 
confused situation.  It is not that one of these conceptions mirrors or otherwise appropriately 
corresponds to an “objective” ethical order and is, consequently, the “true one” while the others 
are “false”. Instead, the dialogical interplay between the clear and fully articulated expressions of 
these different ways of problematizing the conflicted and confused situation results in iterated 
conceptualizations of justice and fairness that lead to the mitigation, reduction or elimination of 
the conflict and confusion in the situation.  It is this “moral deliberation”, with its tacit 
assumption that “one belief can be better than another, that we can improve our beliefs, [and] 
that we can realize that we were mistaken in believing something” (Misak, 2008a) that serves as 
the democratic framework within which health policies emerge. Indeed, as noted by Matthew 
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Festenstein, Dewey’s purpose in “proposing an empirical science of value is to define a sense in 
which the various claims made by plural, and sometimes conflicting, values can be objectively 
appraised.” (Festenstein, 1997)  For Dewey, then, it is possible to think of the practice of ethics 
as an exercise in practical politics, albeit a practical politics that is reflective, deliberative and 
experimental in nature. 
Relative to identifying which health inequalities are health inequities, this means that 
there is no a priori “correct” way to make the delineation; the delineation is always a fallible one 
that emerges out of the specifics involved in trying to resolve one or more conflicted and 
confused situations.  Those who believe that health inequalities of opportunity (or substantive 
inequalities, or access inequalities) based on racial or ethnic characterizations are unfair or unjust 
will make judgments that characterize those inequalities as inequities.  Similarly, those who 
believe that health inequalities of opportunity based on socio-economic status are unjust or unfair 
will make judgments that characterize those inequalities as inequities.  Whatever warrants that 
judgments of either sort have depends, ultimately, on whether the characterizations they use 
permit a mitigation, reduction or elimination of the conflicted and confused situation that led to 
the use of those characterizations. This is the sense in which the judgments have instrumental 
value. Sometimes, the judgments will make use only of antecedently accepted characterizations 
of values.  In these cases, the judgments are descriptive but are not “valuations”.  However, even 
in these cases what remains an open question is whether the accepted characterizations of values 
are correct or fully capture the nature of the situation. Thus, what is crucial both for valuations 
and for judgments that are descriptive is that anyone making the judgment that a health 
inequality is a health inequity must explicitly state what the reasoning is for the characterization. 
It is only when this information is provided and the opportunity for critical thoughtful discussion 
permitted that it is possible to assess the value of the characterization.  As Dewy writes, tools 
such as value judgments “can be evolved and perfected only in operation; in application to 
observing, reporting and organizing actual subject matter; and this application cannot occur save 
through free and systematic communication.” (Dewey, 2008b)  The failure to share information 
about the reasoning behind treating certain health inequalities as health inequities undermines 
any effort to link research about health inequalities to health policies whose purpose is to address 
health inequities, as well as undermining the ability to assess the efficacy and efficiency of those 
health policies.  What matters is not finding the correct “theory of justice” or theory of equality” 
on which to base the judgments we make that transform inequalities into inequities, and the 
policies we construct to address the inequities. Theories are instruments of action, and, for that 
reason, what is crucial to disparities research and policy formation is transparency (of 
assumptions, of intentions, of reasoning) and the willingness to engage in thoughtful, critical 
dialogue with others about the analyses conducted and the policies created. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 According to Amartya Sen, “health is among the most important considerations of human 
life and a critically significant constituent of human capabilities which we have reason to value.” 
(Sen, 2002; Also, see Anand, 2002; Asada, 2005; Marchand, Wikler, & Landesman, 1998)  
However, disparities exist in the distributions of the opportunities to attain or maintain good 
health, and in the health outcomes for various populations. (Mayberry, Mili, & Ofili, 2000; 
Siegel & Nolan, 2009)  The recognition of disparities in the distributions of opportunities to 
attain or maintain good health and in health outcomes for various populations has had a 
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significant impact on the creation of health policies in the United States. (Beal, 2011; National 
Partnership for Action to End Health Disparities, 2011)  One example is Healthy People 2020. 
Although not an explicit topic area for Healthy People 2020, health disparities serve as one of 
four foundation health indicators to track success in meeting the goals of Healthy People 2020.  
Indeed, the Health and Human Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Health Promotion and 
Disease Prevention Objectives for 2020 (Phase I Report from October 28, 2008) included, as one 
of their “overarching goals” for Health People 2020, the target of achieving health equity, 
eliminating disparities, and improving the health of all groups . (Secretary’s Advisory Committee 
on National Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives for 2020, 2008)  This extends and 
expands on Healthy People 2000’s goal of reducing health disparities, and on Healthy People 
2010 in which elimination of health disparities was a key objective. (United States Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2010; Weisfeld & Perlman, 2005)   
Traditionally, there are at least two assumptions made when the presence of health 
disparities is one of the principal driving factors in the creation of health policies. The first 
assumption is that it is not ethically fair or just that some populations have opportunities to attain 
or maintain good health, or have health outcomes that are, in one way or another, “better” than 
another population. (Marchand et al., 1998) As stated by the IOM’s Committee on Quality 
Health Care in America, “the quality of care should not differ because of such characteristics as 
gender, race, age, ethnicity, income, education, disability, sexual orientation, or location of 
residence.” (Committee on Quality Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine, 2001; Also, 
see Le Grand, 1991)  The second assumption is that it is possible to affect, by policy choices, the 
distributions of at least some opportunities to attain or maintain good health, or health outcomes 
in a population. (Daniels et al., 1999)  Although these two assumptions overlap one another in 
important ways, this paper has focused on what conditions warrant judgments that empirically 
established health differences are also health inequities (disparities).  
Like Dewey, we believe that research agendas, as well as “policies and proposals for 
social action” should “be treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to 
and executed.” (Dewey, 2008b)   Thus, because judgments about which health inequalities are 
also inequities are hypotheses whose value rests with their capacity to address specific conflicts 
and confusions of humans and their interactions with one another, “the free exchange of results, 
experiences, arguments and ideals” (Misak, 2008b) is a necessary condition for their accurate 
assessment.  In this connection, Braveman et al. note that “Previous official approaches to 
defining health disparities in the United States have avoided being explicit about values and 
principles”. (P. A. Braveman et al., 2011)  However, for the reasons presented in this paper, it is 
only by fully and clearly stating the assumptions and reasoning that lead to judgments that 
specific health inequalities are also health inequities (disparities) that we can engage in the 
reflective, critical discussion needed to assess the value and importance of such judgments.  The 
answer to whether a health inequality is a health inequity, and so a health disparity in the full 
ethical sense of that expression, cannot be answered a priori by conceptual analysis, or 
statistically by examining health difference.  This latter point is worth emphasizing; No statistical 
analysis, by itself, is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a health inequity. Instead, the 
answer emerges only within ongoing dialogical exchanges constituting the “public 
communicative infrastructure” (Jacobs & Townsley, 2011), where conflicting views about what 
is good, and fair, and just take place, and in which statements of facts become value claims. 
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